Still no valid evidence for State of Emergency

Still no valid evidence for State of Emergency

In the aftermath of the extension of the state of emergency “8/21”, the defence proffered by the People’s Partnership Government’s declaration of the state of emergency presents a rather blurry and increasingly nebulous picture. It has become very clear that transnational organised crimes constitute a growing threat to national security, democracy and the rule of law as opposed to the PP’s invocation of a state of emergency based on apparent foggy intelligence reports. It was anticipated that such a state of emergency would have averted a major crisis or catastrophe that would threaten the life of the nation (the European Court of Human Rights in the Lawless case, defined what is a public emergency).


To date, there is still no valid evidence given by the executive to substantiate that action. Emergencies can be corrosive of democracy if they are claimed “on grounds that involve bad faith, manipulation of evidence, exaggeration of risk or the prospect of political advantage.” Any assessment of emergency action obliges three questions—Is the action authorised by law? Are the extraordinary measures authorised by this law proportional and adequately linked to the assessment of these threats? Does the law contain provisions for the review and termination of these powers?


In addition, the European Commission in the Greek case described four characteristics of a public emergency as follows (a) it must be actual or imminent; (b) its effects must involve the whole nation; (c) the continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened; and (d) the crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures...are plainly inadequate. Furthermore, the International Law Commission looked at the definition of public emergency to constitute four basic elements—territorial scope, magnitude of the threat, temporary status of the public crisis and official proclamation. Given the above in international law and in accord with Section 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to which we are a signatory, there may be some difficulty in such a proclamation of a state of emergency in Trinidad.


Issues of legitimacy, necessity, proportionality and discrimination are bound to arise. Fuelling that public perception is the lack of cohesive statements emanating from the Government’s side, together with the perhaps less than inspirational and convincing arguments following the parliamentary debate for an extension to the SoE.


Strategic targets

What is of urgent and compelling public interest and needs attention is the apprehending and incarceration of all the major players—small to large—involved in the illegal arms and drug trade. This brings me to the arguable point, that this alleged governmental “war on organised crime” ought to be waged in a precise and strategic manner, with no friends or favours. But does this Government possess the political will to do so? Unlike the US which prepared the USPATRIOT ACT before 9/11 and then legislated quickly after, the anti-gang legislation was passed around August 15, and effected immediately on August 21, based on so called intelligence reports. However, in the Government’s attacks on criminals and gangs, it seems to have forgotten those who are allegedly involved in sophisticated “white collar criminal operations,” or is it that they are above, beyond and out of reach of the law?


In the interim, what the nation has observed thus far like the elimination of the Dole Chadee and Aldwyn King gangs, is Phase Two of the elimination of some competitors involving gangs in the illegal drug trafficking, and known to the law enforcement authorities, whilst the hegemonic structure of who’s who in control and facilitate the illegal trade remain intact. In essence, the so called “state of emergency” whilst not meeting the threshold test of what constitutes a genuine state of emergency is in essence a fight against organised crime. The challenge with this fight is very complex as there may very well exist a hybrid connection between financiers of political parties, bankers, government officials, politicians, and in turn the business facilitators involved in the greed for filthy lucre.


Look for example at the involvement of officialdom in the diesel racket trade, in the human trafficking trade. Who from the national security agencies use to rent weapons to criminals to “put down wuk?” Who are accustomed to facilitating arrivals of unchecked containers? With all the local, regional and international treaties and legislations that we have signed and ratified, why are there so much drugs and guns entering the country? Why are the official facilitators from the Government side not arrested by any counter-intelligence sources?


What we have is a nation seduced by the international criminal networks, with local connections that have since passed the predatory state and have been promoted from the parasitical state. According to Peter Lupsha, “They develop a corruptive interaction with legitimate power sectors and mold their control of a territorial base) to the symbiotic state, where the equal parasitical bond between organised crime and the political system becomes one of mutuality.” In this way, Lupsha states that “the host becomes dependent on the parasite to sustain itself. When organised crime reaches the symbiotic stage, it is no longer a law enforcement problem, it is a matter of national security.”